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The Perils of Harmonization: Refusal To
Supply Spare Parts, Article 82 of the
European Community Treaty, and Abuse of

a Dominant Position
Bruce Carolan*
I.

Introduction

This paper considers a discrete area of the law of the European
Union, an area of law that concerns whether a refusal to supply spare
parts can amount to an abuse of a dominant position and a violation of
the competition law of the European Union, even if the undertaking that
refuses to supply spare parts occupies a relatively small portion of the
market for the good for which spare parts are sought.
The European Commission (Commission) has stated that its view of
the matter is in line with the position adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.
* Head of Department of Legal Studies, Dublin Institute of Technology, Aungier
Street, Dublin 2, Ireland, bruce.carolan@dit.ie. Past President, Irish Association of Law
Teachers. Remarks delivered at the meeting of the Antitrust Section of the annual
conference of the Association of American Law Schools, Washington, D.C., January 4,
2003. My thanks to Ciaran Walker for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are my
Own.
1. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). In the XXVth Report of the European Commission on
Competition Policy, the Commission stated:
Several complaints which the Commission received concern the alleged abuse
of a dominant position in secondary product markets such as spare parts,
consumables or maintenance services. These products are used in conjunction
with a primary product and have to be technically compatible with it (e.g.,
software or hardware peripheral equipment for a computer). Thus, for these
secondary products there may be no or few substitutes other than parts or
services supplied by the primary product supplier. This prompts the question
whether a non-dominant manufacturer of primary products can be dominant
with respect to a rather small secondary product market, i.e. secondary products
compatible with a certain type of that manufacturer's primary products.
The question raises many complex issues. Producers of primary equipment
argue that there cannot be dominance in secondary products if there is lack of
dominance in the primary product market because potential buyers would
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My remarks focus on the approach adopted by the Commission and the
Court of Justice in the European Communities in several little-noted
cases.
What accounts for my interest in these little-known cases? Several
years ago, while teaching law at University College, Cork, the Dean
asked me to consult with a local law firm on a point of law. The file that
I reviewed described a commercial contract dispute between an Irish
appliance manufacturer and a small Cork shop that was in the business
of, among other things, servicing and repairing different makes and
models of appliances. The manufacturer had unilaterally changed the
terms under which it would supply the spare parts necessary for the
operation of the repair business. The complaint alleged a breach of an
oral and implied-in-fact contract.
A modest amount of research convinced me that this small contract
dispute could be transformed into a competition law claim under Irish
Competition Law,2 which was modeled on the corresponding
Competition Law of the European Community. 3 Although the Irish
appliance manufacturer occupied a relatively small portion of the Irish
simply stop buying the primary products if the prices for parts or services were
raised. This theory implies a timely reaction on the primary product market
due to consumers' ability to calculate the overall life-time costs of the primary
product including all spare parts, consumables, upgrades, services, etc. It
furthermore implies that price discrimination is not possible between
potentially new customers and "old" captive customers or that switching costs
for the latter are low. On the other hand, complainants who produce
consumables or maintenance services assume dominance in the secondary
product market if market shares are high in this market, i.e. this approach
focuses only on the secondary products without analyzing possible effects
emanating from the primary product market.
In the Commission's view, neither of these approaches reflects reality
sufficiently. Dominance has always been defined by the Commission as the
ability to act to an appreciable extent independently of competitors and
consumers. Therefore, an in-depth fact-finding exercise and analysis on a caseby-case basis are required. In order to assess dominance in this context the
Commission will take into account all important factors such as the price and
life-time of the primary product, transparency of prices of secondary products,
prices of secondary products as a proportion of the primary product value,
information costs and other issues partly mentioned above. A similar approach
was taken by the US Supreme Court in its 1992 Kodak decision.
EUROPEAN COMM'N, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

86 (1995), available at

http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/ra950 lenen.pdf. The Commission's
stated view blurs the fact that the issue in Kodak was quite narrow: whether there was
sufficient evidence to preclude the grant of summary judgement to the defendant Kodak.
Kodak, 540 U.S. at 454-56. It is difficult to extrapolate substantive antitrust policy from
a Supreme Court decision concerning such an early stage of an antitrust case.
2. See
Competition
Act,
24
(1991)
(Ir.),
available
at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/front.html.
3.

See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, arts. 81-

82, O.J. (C 340) 3, 208-09 [hereinafter EC TREATY].
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market for the appliance in question, the law of the European Union, as
announced by the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Court
of Justice or Court) and applied by the Commission, permitted a claim to
be asserted in good faith that the appliance manufacturer had abused a
dominant positiona4-roughly equivalent to a claim
of monopolization
5
under section 2 of the United States Sherman Act.
The complaint was amended, the claim asserted, and vigorous
discovery pursued on this new antitrust issue. The case was transformed
from a run-of-the-mill commercial dispute into a full-blown antitrust
claim. The case settled on terms favorable to the shop owner. I later
heard that, thereafter, a number of other small shops adversely affected
by the manufacturer's decision to change its after-sales service policies
amended their contract claims in pursuit of a broader competition law
claim.
Case 22/73, Hugin KassaregisterAB v. Commission,6 is the leading
decision of the Court of Justice that addresses this issue. This case, and
the subsequent interpretation/enforcement of the decision by the
European Commission, in some ways presaged the later decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Kodak. Although the European Court
reached essentially the same conclusion as the majority in the Kodak
case, it traveled a different route to this conclusion and applied different
reasoning at several points. This paper outlines the decision of the
European Court, and, at one critical juncture, compares its reasoning
with that of the Supreme Court in Kodak.
In addition to my personal interest, this topic is relevant to the
subject of this year's conference of the Association of American Law
Schools, "Legal Education Engages the World." It is no longer sufficient
for United States law students simply to be aware of United States
federal and state laws pertaining to competition. In an era of increasing
economic interdependence, domestic corporations may find themselves
subjected to foreign competition laws, such as those of the European
Union. To give comprehensive legal advice to companies that may be
modest in size, but whose economic dealings have an effect on a
European market, it is necessary to have some familiarity with at least
the broad outlines of European Union competition law (as antitrust law is
known in the European Union). Additionally, there is an increasing
trend towards the "convergence" of antitrust/competition law principles.
In Europe, this convergence has taken place from the supranational to the

4.
[1979]
5.
6.

See Case 22/73, Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1869,
3 C.M.L.R. 345 (1979) (E.C.J.).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2001).
1979 E.C.R. 1869, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345 (1979) (E.C.J.).
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national level. That is, prior to the Treaty of Rome's adoption of Articles
81 and 82 of the European Community Treaty in 1957 (numbered
Articles 85 and 86 in the European Community Treaty before the
renumbering brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam),7 most Member
States of the European Union, such as, for example, Ireland, did not have
any domestic "antitrust" laws. In Ireland, for example, before the
adoption of the Competition Act in 1991,8 allegations of restraint of trade
were analyzed from a common-law contract perspective, without the
sophistication associated with analysis of competition law issues in
jurisdictions such as the United States. In Member States that did have
some form of competition law, such as, for example, the United
Kingdom, the law tended to focus on form over substance. 9 That is,
analysis of competition law issues did not concentrate on the effects of
potentially anti-competitive agreements, but rather emphasized the form
that these agreements took.
However, after the adoption of European Community (Community)
law regarding competition, Member States began to adopt domestic law
patterned after Community law. These domestic laws would apply in
situations where the undertakings or commercial transactions involved
were not large enough to be covered by Community law because, for
example, the transaction amount was de minimus, or the transaction did
not have an effect on trade between Member States, a jurisdictional
prerequisite for application of European Union law.' 0 In some instances,
for example Ireland, virtually identical language was used in the
domestic law, although the law also contained provisions for domestic
enforcement that, naturally, were not contained in the Community law."
of domestic
or "approximation"
"harmonization"
Eventually,
competition law began to occur across the Member States of the
European Union-perhaps a greater degree of harmonization than that
seen across state antitrust laws in the United States.

7.

EC TREATY arts. 81-82.

at
available
(Ir.),
(1991)
24
Act,
8. Competition
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/front.html.
available at
(Eng.),
1973,
c. 41
Act,
Fair
Trading
9. See
http://www.consuml .freeuk.com/Fair TradingAct_1973.PDF.
10. See EC TREATY art. 81; see also Case 56/65, La Technique Miniere v.
Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.C.R. 337, 1966 C.M.L.R. 357 (1966) (E.C.J.).
11.
Compare Competition Act § 4(1) ("[A]ll agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as their

object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in trade ... are
prohibited and void.") with EC TREATY art. 81(1) ("[A]l1 agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which
may effect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.., are
prohibited.").
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Of course, this provides another reason for the need to study
principles of European Union competition law.
The increasing
convergence of European domestic laws around European Union
competition law norms implies that, even for quite small transactions
involving United States firms, including those that fall beneath the
Commission's de minimus threshold or that do not affect trade between
European Union Member States, an unsuspecting
company may be
2
caught by domestic European competition laws.'
This form of convergence, from the supranational to the national, is
not limited to the Member States of the European Union. There are more
than ninety countries with some form of competition policy and it is
possible that in interpreting these policies individual countries might be
influenced by European Union, as well as United States, competition law
policies.13

Finally, there is a possibility of another form of "convergence."
The competition law principles embodied in the supranational law of the
European Union might be adopted at an international level. The Doha
Development Agenda of the World Trade Organization contains the
possibility for introducing competition law norms into the world's
multilateral trading system.' 4 The agenda for the Free Trade Area of the
Americas explicitly carves out competition law as an express area for
negotiation.' 5 Competition law principles of the European Union may be
12. The convergence of European Union competition law norms at the national level
is complicated somewhat by the Commission's new policy on "decentralization." See
Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules on
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and Amending Regulations
(EEC) 1017/68, (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC)
No 3975/87 ('Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty '), 2000 O.J. (C
365E) 284 (E.C.). Under decentralization, enforcement of European Community
competition law will be devolved, at least in part, to national competition law
enforcement authorities. Furthermore, national courts will be empowered to apply
Article 81(3) to agreements in restraint of trade that are "caught" by Article 81 (1). See
EC TREATY art. 81. However, the minimum thresholds for application of Community
law and the requirement of an effect on trade between Member States will continue to
apply where national authorities seek to enforce Community competition law. Thus, it is
possible that certain behavior will not be caught by European Union competition laweven as enforced by national authorities-but nevertheless still fall afoul of national
competition law. As shown below, this is particularly relevant to the topic of my
remarks.
13. William E. Kovacic, General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission,
Address at the Annual Conference of the Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation
of the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 4, 2003).
14. WTO, Ministerial Declaration: Ministerial Conference Fourth Session Doha,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I
20
(Nov.
14,
2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0 l e/mindecl e.htm.
15. See Free Trade Area of the Ams., Negotiating Groups, at http://www.ftaaalca.org/ngroupe.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
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influential in adopting competition law norms at the level of international
agreement.
The Commission is at the forefront of efforts to adopt competition
norms at the international level. The Commission has taken credit for
launching the idea of including competition policy in the latest phase of
World Trade Organization negotiations launched at Doha. 16 These
proposals exist at only a nascent stage (with participants agreeing to
discuss modalities for inclusion of competition norms in multi-lateral
trade talks). Furthermore, the substantive competition law norms to be
discussed are likely to center upon "core" principles directed against
hard-core cartel behavior. However, knowledge of Community attitudes
in the areas discussed in my remarks is important in light of the
Commission's role in promoting adoption of competition norms at the
international level.
This paper focuses on one such norm largely through an
examination of one particular case. In Case 22/73, Hugin Kassaregister
AB v. Commission, the European Community considered whether a firm
could be found liable for abuse of a dominant position (roughly
equivalent to a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act) even where the
firm occupied a relatively modest proportion of the relevant primary
market for a particular product.1 7 In Hugin, this amounted to
approximately twelve percent of the market for cash registers.18 The
result in some ways foreshadowed the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Kodak, and may have continuing and surprising
implications for United States companies doing business in Europe.
Unilateral decisions that ordinarily would not be subjected to the
heightened scrutiny of antitrust laws may trigger liability for abuse of a
dominant position under the reasoning of Hugin and other cases of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities. United States firms may
need to (re)consider positions relating to issues such as vertical
integration and after-sales service, in light of the holding of this littlenoted case. Finally, legal advisers and policymakers should be aware of
this case in contributing to debates about further harmonization of
antitrust or competition law norms at the international level.

16. Commissioner Mario Monti, EU Competition Policy, Speech at the Fordham
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 31, 2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECHI02/533 I
0]RAPID&g=EN&display =.
17. 1979 E.C.R. 1869, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345 (1979) (E.C.J.).
18. Id. at 1873, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 347.
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Refusal To Supply Spare Parts and Abuse of a Dominant Position

A.

Overview ofArticle 82 of the European Community Treaty

Article 82 of the European Community Treaty prohibits any abuse
of a dominant position within the Common Market or in a substantial
9
part of it, insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.'
Determining whether an abuse has occurred requires consideration of
two separate substantive issues: whether an economic undertaking
occupies a dominant position within the Common Market or a substantial
part of it, and whether there has been an abuse of that dominant
position. 2 0 In addition, it is necessary to consider the jurisdictional issue
of whether the abuse appreciably affects competition and trade between
Member States.2'
A dominant position has been defined by reference to the power
enjoyed by an undertaking. In other words, a dominant position is a
position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking that enables it
to prevent competition being maintained on the relevant market by
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently
of its competitors, its customers, and ultimately its consumers.22 An
abuse of a dominant position consists of practices that are likely to affect
the structure of the market where competition is already weakened
because of the presence of the undertaking in question and that, through
recourse to methods other than those based on performance, have the
effect of preventing the maintenance or development of the level of
competition still existing on the market. 23 A firm in a dominant position
"has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine
24
undistorted competition on the Common Market.,
An important, though not conclusive, criterion for assessing whether
an undertaking occupies a dominant position (and thus is subject to the
heightened scrutiny and responsibilities imposed by Article 82) is the
market share occupied by the undertaking.25 Other important criteria are

19.

EC

TREATY

art. 82.

20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Case 85/75, Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461,
516-22, 572-76, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 240-48, 266-78 (1979) (E.C.J.); Case 27/76,
United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 255-61, 275-99, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R.
83, 105-08, 115-29 (1978) (E.C.J.).
23. Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission,
1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3507-16, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 304-09 (1983) (E.C.J.).
24. Id.at 3551-52, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 327.
25. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 255-61, 275-99, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 105-08,
I 15-29
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the market share of competitors, the technical lead enjoyed by an
undertaking, and the barriers to entry."
In order to determine market share, it is necessary to define the
relevant market, which comprises the relevant product market and
relevant geographic market (although decisions of the Commission and
the Court of Justice often do not expressly consider this latter issue).27
The relevant product market includes the product in question and other
"equivalent products," with equivalence being determined primarily by
the interchangeability of the products in question, assessed from the
perspective of the consumer of the product in light of the product's price,
characteristics, and intended use.2" The relevant geographic market is
that area where conditions of competition are relatively homogeneous. 29
B.

Hugin Case
1.

Introduction

The Hugin case is interesting primarily from the perspective of
whether there may be sub-markets in a broader market within which an
undertaking may occupy a dominant position (and thus be subject to
Article 82 scrutiny), even though the undertaking occupies a relatively
30

small portion of the overall market for the product in question.
Although the Commission was ultimately unsuccessful, the Commission
decision,31 the recommendation of the Advocate General,32 and the
judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Community 33 contain
significant implications in a variety of contexts, such as the uncritical

adoption of European Community law norms at the national level, and
the possible adoption of such norms at the international level.
A Commission decision following Hugin, Brass Band Instruments
Ltd. v. Boosey & Hawkes Plc,3 4 shows that the Commission continues to
26. Id. at 285-99, 330-35, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 120-29, 142-49.
27. See, e.g., Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215,
247-50, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199, 226-27 (1973) (E.C.J.).

28.

United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 211-13, 255-61, 275-99, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 85,

105-08, 115-29; Europemballage, 1973 E.C.R. at 247-50, [1973] C.M.L.R. at 226-27.

29. UnitedBrands, 1978 E.C.R. at 261-75, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 108-15.
30. See Case 22/73, Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1869,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345 (1979) (E.C.J.).
31. Commission Decision 78/68/EEC, Cash Registers & Bus. Equip. Ltd. v. Hugin
Kassaregister AB, 1978 O.J. (L 22) 23 (E.C.) [hereinafter Commission Decision, Hugin].
32. Hugin, 1979 E.C.R. at 1871-1911, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 347-69.
33. Id. at 1913-25, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 369-375.
34. Commission Decision 500/87, Brass Band Instruments Ltd. v. Boosey &
Hawkes Ple, 1987 O.J. (L 286) 36 (E.C.) [hereinafter Commission Decision, Brass
Band].
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take the position that very narrow product markets exist, within which
fairly small economic undertakings may be viewed as occupying a
dominant position. Furthermore, in both Hugin and Brass Band, the
Commission, and the Advocate General, took a narrow view of what
constituted a legitimate justification for certain business practices
relevant to vertical integration and after-sales service. The combined
effect of these rulings (on dominant position and abuse) may lay a trap
for unwary United States companies operating in European markets.
2.

Commission Decision

The Commission decision was issued on December 8, 1977.35 The
Commission found a violation of Article 82 (then Article 86) by reason
of the refusal of Hugin to supply spare parts to a small United Kingdom
company called Liptons.36
a.

Facts

Hugin AB of Stokholm, Sweden, was a major manufacturer of cash
registers and similar products. At the time of the Commission decision
approximately ninety-seven percent of Hugin's products were sold
outside of Sweden. 37 It had subsidiaries throughout the European Union
(then known as the European Economic Community), including a
subsidiary in the United Kingdom (Hugin UK). In addition to the sale of
cash registers, Hugin UK engaged in the service and repair of Hugin cash
registers, which accounted for approximately38 thirty-four percent of the
subsidiary's turnover in the United Kingdom.
Liptons Cash Register and Business Equipment Ltd. (Liptons) was a
small company established in London that specialized in business
machines, particularly cash registers. Liptons engaged in the service,
repair, reconditioning, sale, and rental of cash registers of most makes
and models.39 It established a satisfactory business relationship with
Hugin UK, as the result of which it was appointed as an agent to sell and
repair Hugin cash registers in the United Kingdom.4 °
The Commission described the market for the supply of cash
registers in the Common Market (as the economic area of the European
41
Economic Community was also known) as being "rather oligopolistic.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Commission Decision, Hugin, supra note 31.

Id
Id. (Part 1).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id (Part I.A).
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The National Cash Register Company of the United States had an overall
market share of approximately thirty-six percent. The next largest
manufacturer was the German firm Anka with fifteen percent.42 Sweda,
another American firm, held thirteen percent. Hugin had the fourth
largest market share with approximately twelve percent. A number of
Japanese producers, recent entrants to the Common Market, together
held a total of thirteen percent, while all other producers accounted for
approximately eleven percent.43
Within the United Kingdom itself, the Commission found that
National Cash Register held approximately forty percent of the market,
Sweda eighteen percent, a United Kingdom firm named Gross
approximately sixteen percent, and Hugin thirteen percent.44 Anka had
about four percent and all other producers together held nine percent.
Thus, with respect to the market for cash registers themselves, Hugin
held a relatively modest share of the market within both the Common
Market and the United Kingdom, albeit in an oligopolistic market
45
structure.
Cash registers were described by the Commission as being
"complicated and sophisticated machines," having up to 2000 different
parts. 46 All producers laid great emphasis on after-sales services in
respect of their products, and this was a significant factor in the
competitive position of the producer. Hugin placed great stress on the
servicing and repair of its machines and claimed that, in order to
maintain high standards with respect to such services, it not only carried
out maintenance and repair itself, but refused to supply spare parts to
independent dealers who might undertake to offer repair services for
Hugin cash registers.47
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a boom in cash register
sales in the United Kingdom due to the introduction of decimalization in
the British monetary system. This led to an increase in the demand for
the servicing and repair of Hugin cash registers sold in the United
Kingdom. Whereas, prior to this boom period, Liptons had been limited
to servicing and repairing only those Hugin cash register machines that it
had itself sold as authorized agent for Hugin UK (and not those sold by
Hugin UK), during this period Hugin UK authorized Liptons to engage
in the servicing and repair of Hugin cash registers generally. 48 Liptons
42.
43.

Id.(Part 1).
Id.

44.

Id

45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. (Part I.B).
Id. (Part 1).

48.

Id.
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expanded that portion of its business devoted to the sale and repair of
Hugin cash registers, eventually establishing a network of thirty agents
throughout England, Wales, and Scotland to sell Hugin cash registers and
took on additional staff to repair, maintain, and modify Hugin machines.
Between April 1969 and May 1972, Liptons purchased spare parts for
Hugin cash registers worth approximately £10,000 Sterling.49
In October 1972, Hugin UK refused to supply Liptons with any
spare parts for Hugin cash registers other than minor parts not related to
the repair or maintenance of such cash registers. Following this refusal,
Liptons tried to source spare parts necessary for the continuation of its
repair/maintenance business from other countries.
Liptons was
unsuccessful. Liptons wrote to Hugin UK asking that it resume the
supply of spare parts. 50 Hugin UK refused and wrote: "In order to
protect our customers and to ensure that they receive the correct service
and that any guarantees that are promised can be met we reserve the right
to ensure that all service work is carried out by employees of our
company." 51
In response to later Commission queries about the decision to refuse
to supply spare parts to Liptons, Hugin UK echoed its earlier response to
Liptons. Hugin wrote:
Hugin wishes to avoid having its products serviced by unqualified
personnel as this could lead to customer dissatisfaction and therefore
authorized dealers are not appointed by Hugin unless they are able to
maintain Hugin's high standards of service and maintenance ....In

no cases52 are spare parts sold for resale other than to authorized
dealers.

Hugin, the parent company, confirmed that it did not supply spare parts
outside of its own distribution network, implicitly confirming that other
authorized dealers were effectively forbidden to sell to Liptons for its
repair and maintenance business. The Hugin parent stated to the
Commission that if Hugin UK supplied spare parts to Liptons it would
pose a risk of deteriorated reputation as to the quality of Hugin cash
registers and their service, which might result in a loss of customers.5 3
As a result of the refusal to supply spare parts to Liptons, Liptons
was no longer able to engage in, among other things, the business of
repair and maintenance of Hugin cash registers.54 It also adversely

49.

Id.

50. Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.(Part .E).
Id.
Id.(Part I).
Id.
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affected Liptons's ability to rent and to recondition Hugin cash registers,
activities in which it engaged, in addition to the repair and maintenance
of Hugin machines. Because the component parts of Hugin cash
registers were not interchangeable with other brands, Liptons could not
seek to continue its repair and maintenance business by using spare parts
available for other brands of cash registers.55
b.

Commission's Legal Assessment

With little analysis of the issue, the Commission concluded in its
decision that:
Hugin ... enjoys a monopoly in Hugin spare parts throughout the

world and thus, with its subsidiaries established in the common
market, it holds a dominant position in the common market for the
supply of such spare parts. Hugin therefore has a dominant position
for the maintenance and repair of Hugin cash registers in relation to
companies which need a supply of Hugin spare parts. It follows,
therefore, that Hugin [parent and subsidiary] hold a dominant
position for these products and services in that substantial part of the
common market consisting of England, Scotland and Wales. Such
dominant position extends to the business, such as Liptons carried
on, of reconditioning and repairing used Hugin cash registers which
also depends upon a supply of Hugin spare parts. As the business of
renting out Hugin cash registers depends upon a supply of spare parts
in order that the owner may carry out his -own maintenance and
repair, Hugin... also has a dominant position in relation to such
owners. 56
In other words, the Commission implicitly refused to accept that the
market for Hugin cash registers and the after-sales service (in the form of
maintenance and repair) constituted a single, indivisible product market.
Even given the oligopolistic structure of this (single) market, Hugin's
twelve percent share (of the Common Market and of the United
Kingdom) would not have been sufficient to establish that Hugin held a
dominant position in this (undivided) market. In the absence of a
dominant position, Hugin's unilateral decision to refuse to sell spare
parts to Liptons would not have been subject to scrutiny under Article 82
of the European Community Treaty. However, by dividing the market
for Hugin cash registers from the market for spare parts for Hugin cash
registers (which spare parts were not interchangeable with spare parts for
other brands of cash registers), the Commission was able to conclude that
Hugin occupied a dominant position in this separate market (indeed, that
55.
56.

Id.
Id. (Part ILA).
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it had a one hundred percent share of this narrow market).57 The
Commission also concluded that Hugin held a dominant position in those
markets that demanded a supply of spare parts, such as the market for
maintenance and repair and the market of renting out Hugin cash
registers. 58
The conclusion that Hugin occupied a dominant position in the
market for spare parts (and the related markets of maintenance, repair,
and rental of Hugin cash registers) did not mean that Hugin was guilty of
a violation of Article 82 of the European Union Community Treaty. It
was necessary to determine whether there had been an abuse of this
dominant position. The Commission set forth the following "test" to
determine whether an abuse of a dominant position had occurred in the
case:
In cases in which an undertaking holding a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it for the supply
of certain products, and in particular where the dominant position is a
monopoly:
(a) refused without objective justification to supply those products
to existing substantial customers for and user of the products, and the
refusal to supply seriously injures the latter in their business by
interfering with and ultimately preventing them from continuing to
offer a service or to carry on a line of business, thereby ultimately
eliminating all competitors independent of the dominant undertaking
from the market for that service or that line of business; and
(b) prohibits it subsidiaries and dealers from supplying those
products outside its own distribution network and in particular to
buyers in other Member States, thereby making the refusal to supply
more effective by denying those products to the customers and users
in question,
Such conduct amounts to an abuse of a dominant position, where it
causes competition to be substantially restricted
and trade between
59
Member States to be affected appreciably.
It should not be surprising that the Commission determined that an
abuse of a dominant position had occurred, 60 as the "test" essentially was
a recitation of the facts of the case. The only issue that posed a factual
question for the Commission was whether there was an "objective
justification" for the refusal to supply spare parts. Hugin had relied upon
the need to assure high quality after-sales service in order to compete
effectively with other cash register producers and to avoid loss of
57.

Id.

58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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customers that might result from shoddy repair work by independent
operators. The Commission rejected Hugin's defense:
The reasons given by Hugin for its refusal to supply Liptons are not
objectively sufficient to justify such refusal. Even if it were correct
that a Hugin cash register was a product of such complexity as to
require special training beyond that required for any other
mechanical, electro-mechanical or electronic product of a similar
kind which, in view of the evidence available, the Commission does
not accept, it would still not justify Hugin from withdrawing supplies
of spare parts from Liptons at61 a time when it clearly was in
possession of the necessary skills.
Finally, the Commission concluded that "[t]he abuses of Hugin
[parent] of its dominant position appreciably affect trade between
Member States. The prohibition on the export of spare parts from all
Member States to any firm other than an authorized dealer directly
affects trade between Member States. 62
The Commission decision would impose additional obligations on
virtually any company that provides after-sales service utilizing spare
parts that are not readily available from an alternative source, regardless
of that company's market share in the underlying product. Assuming
that jurisdictional thresholds were surpassed, then unilateral decisions
with respect to the supply of spare parts would come under the
heightened scrutiny of Article 82. Companies that might wish to
integrate vertically so as to reduce monitoring costs in the provision of a
high-quality after-sales service might face liability under Article 82, or a
similar competition law norm. The Commission decision implies that an
undertaking would be required to provide "good cause" for the
termination of an existing relationship, sufficient to satisfy a trier of fact.
The Commission imposed a fine and ordered that Hugin restore a
supply of spare parts to Liptons or face fines for its refusal.63 Hugin
took
64
an appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
3.

Advocate General's Recommendation

Advocate General Reischl delivered his opinion to the Court of

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (Part ILE).
64. The Hugin decision pre-dated the creation of the Court of First Instance, the
body to which appeals from Commission decisions are now taken. In cases before the
Court of Justice, a (non-binding) recommendation as to the proper outcome is given by
an Advocate General, an official attached to the Court of Justice.
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Justice. 65 He recited the facts of the case in a manner roughly consistent

with the facts set forth in the Commission decision, although perhaps
showing slightly more consideration of Hugin's stated business
purposes. 66 On the legal issues, he considered, first, whether Hugin
occupied a dominant position and, second, whether Hugin had abused
this dominant position. 7
a.

Dominance

With respect to the issue of whether Hugin occupied a dominant
position, the Advocate General's opinion showed considerably more
analysis than was contained in the Commission decision. 68 He divided
the issue into two separate queries: first, he asked whether a separate
market for Hugin spare parts existed, and, second, recalling that
dominance is defined by reference to the power of the allegedly
dominant undertaking, he asked whether Hugin had the power to act
69
independently of its competitors, its customers, and its consumers.
On the issue of whether a separate market existed for Hugin spare
parts, the Advocate General set forth Hugin's position that "the
Commission relied on too narrow a definition of the relevant market7
the supply of Hugin spare parts and the servicing of Hugin machines. , 0
According to Hugin, "those services should be viewed in conjunction
with the market for cash registers. In that market they are but one
71
element of competition.,

The Advocate General conceded "that the supply of spare parts and
the servicing of cash registers are elements of competition on the market
in cash registers which naturally are of importance to customers when
they acquire cash registers. 72 However, "this does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that such services are only to be viewed in conjunction
with the market for cash registers and that they do not have any
independent significance., 73 In support of this conclusion, he pointed to
the existence of approximately forty undertakings (apart from Liptons)

65.

Case 22/73, Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1869, 1871-

1911, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345, 347-69 (1979) (E.C.J.).
66. Compare Commission Decision, Hugin, supra note 31, with Hugin, 1979 E.C.R.
at 1871-73, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 348-49.
67. Hugin, 1979 E.C.R. at 1875-89, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 350-57.
68. Compare Commission Decision, Hugin, supra note 3 1, with Hugin, 1979 E.C.R.
at 1875-89, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 350-57.
69. Hugin, 1979 E.C.R. at 1875, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 350.
70. Id.

71.

Id.

72.
73.

Id. at 1877, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 351.
Id.
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engaged in the maintenance and repair of cash register machines.74 The
Advocate General therefore concluded that "the Commission was right to
assume that there is a particular market for spare parts and after-sales
service for cash registers and to raise the question of whether
Hugin
'75
way."
that
in
defined
market
a
on
position
dominant
a
occupies
However, according to the Advocate General, the conclusions that a
separate market existed for Hugin spare parts and services and that,
practically speaking, there was no interchangeability between Hugin
spare parts and other spare parts (and thus no realistic possibility of
servicing Hugin cash registers without Hugin spare parts) did not
conclusively resolve the issue of whether Hugin occupied a dominant
position in these markets. This required consideration of a separate
issue: whether Hugin possessed power in this market to operate without
regard to its competitors, customers, or consumers.
The Advocate General concluded that such independent behavior
was possible.76 Two factors influenced his decision. The value of spare
parts relative to the overall cost of the machine meant that prices of spare
parts could be raised considerably without affecting overall demand for
the cash register machine,7 7 and "there exists a separate category of
customers for spare parts, that of independent service undertakings [like
Liptons], which may be taken to be even more genuinely dependent on
Hugin, which in turn leaves considerable scope for the independent
fixing of prices. 78
In other words, the Advocate General took note of the fact that sales
of spare parts take place on two separate levels-to ordinary cash
register users and to those engaged in the business of maintaining and
servicing those cash registers during their useful life. The latter group of
customers would be more dependent on Hugin for spare parts than the
ordinary cash register user, allowing more scope for independent action
by Hugin with respect to, for example, pricing. It was the existence and
dependence of this second group of users of spare parts that tipped the
balance in the Advocate General's conclusion that Hugin occupied a
dominant position in the market for spare parts.79
b.

Abuse of Dominance

Of course, the fact that Hugin occupied a dominant position in the

74.

Id.

75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 1882-83, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 354.

77.

Id.

78.
79.

Id. at 1884-85, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 355.
ld. at 1885-88, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 355-56.
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market for spare parts did not, in itself, amount to a violation of Article
82. It was necessary to consider the Commission's determination that
Hugin had violated European Community law by committing an abuse of
that dominant position. The Commission had decided that Hugin abused
its dominant position by its refusal to supply spare parts to an existing
customer, Liptons. 8° These spare parts were necessary for Liptons to
continue to provide maintenance and repair services.
Hugin essentially asserted two challenges to the Commission
finding. First, it argued that its activities failed to affect adversely
competition, and, furthermore, failed to affect adversely a competitor (in
the market for maintenance and repair), namely Liptons. 8' Second,82 it
asserted that its refusal to supply spare parts was objectively justified.
With respect to the first defense-that is, an absence of damage to
competition-Hugin argued that "the policy pursued by them which was
criticized by the Commission does not lead to any substantial restriction
of competition as the market for spare parts and servicing of cash
registers, in which hardly any independent undertakings are active, is not
an important market. ''83 The Advocate General recommended the
rejection of this defense. He wrote:
[A]n undertaking which refuses to supply brand-new original spare
parts which cannot be obtained elsewhere to independent
undertakings and which thus seeks to monopolize the market in aftersales servicing in so far as it is dependent on new spare parts, can in
principle not rely on the objection that the market is of merely minor
importance and that there
are therefore no significant detrimental
84
effects on competition.
With respect to the argument by Hugin that its policy did not
adversely affect Liptons, which continued in business despite the refusal
to supply spare parts, the Advocate General wrote:
[I]t is not possible to say that there has been no abuse against Liptons
on the ground that that undertaking has not disappeared from the
commercial world and that a certain falling-off of its business is the
result of the general economic trend rather than Hugin's commercial
policy ....[I]t is not only when a competitor is, as it were, given the

death blow that an abuse
85 within the meaning of Article 86 [now
Article 82] is constituted.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at

1887-88, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 356.
1898-99, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 362.
1890-91, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 358.
1892, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 359.
1898-99, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 362.
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The Advocate General did not require any showing of commercial
damage to Liptons to satisfy himself that an abuse had occurred, because
"it may certainly be assumed that Hugin's commercial policy
detrimentally affected Liptons's commercial activities. 86
Hugin's second defense to the Commission's finding of an abuse
was that of objective justification. In this respect, Hugin argued that "the
market for cash registers and their servicing shows peculiarities which do
not exist on the markets for other technical equipment. 87 In support of
its argument that an objective justification existed for its commercial
policy, Hugin also cited the exemptions under Article 81(3), then Article
85, for certain selective distribution systems that require after-sales
services to be provided exclusively by the retailer in a distribution
chain. 88 Finally, Hugin maintained that Liptons failed to provide an
adequate level of service to continue in its capacity as an independent
dealer providing maintenance and repair services.89
The Advocate General rejected all of Hugin's arguments. 90 He
noted that other cash register manufacturers, such as National Cash
Register, did not restrict after-sales service provision to authorized
dealers. Thus, he refused to accept that unique characteristics of the
market justified the refusal to supply spare parts. 91 He also rejected the
attempted analogy to restricted distributions systems allowed in certain
instances under Article 81.92 He wrote: "[I]t is ...not permissible to
practice unilaterally without more ado what appears permissible on the
basis of agreements concluded with independent market operators and
notified to the Commission. 93 In other words, the selective distribution
systems cited by Hugin were not outside the scope of Article 81
Their anti-competitive effects were enough to trigger
altogether.
application of Article 81(1). However, under the balancing of competing
interests under Article 81(3), for example the increase in inter-brand
competition versus the reduction in intra-brand competition resulting
from a selective distribution system, a decision had been made to exempt
such restrictive agreements from the operation of Article 81(2). That is,
they were not null and void, despite their somewhat anti-competitive
consequences. No such balancing had occurred with respect to Hugin's
commercial policy, and, as a result, Hugin could not rely on approval of

86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 1900-01, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 363.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.at 1914-15, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 375.
Id.at 1903, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 364.
Id.
Id. at 1900-01, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 363.
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selective distribution systems in another context.
Finally, the Advocate General rejected the argument that Liptons
was not good enough to be an authorized provider of maintenance and
repair service. 94 "Accordingly it can be held only that there appear to be
no objective reasons to exclude the application of Article 86 [now Article
82] to the applicants' commercial policy with regard to after-sales
service and in particular in relation to Lipton[s]." 95
The Advocate General's recommendation is noteworthy in several
respects. It accepts the existence of very narrowly defined product
markets, such as that for spare parts necessary to engage in maintenance
and repair services, in which even quite small undertakings will, almost
by definition, occupy a dominant, if not a monopolistic, position. From
this follows the heightened scrutiny of unilateral action that otherwise
would escape attention under competition law. In applying that scrutiny,
the objective justification of commercial policy is given little weight, and
is subject to penetrating scrutiny for justification. In other words,
commercial policy justifications based on effects to reputation are
rejected if other undertakings do not share the same philosophy.
Justifications based on performance review are rejected almost out of
hand, in the absence of compelling objective evidence.
These recommendations are potentially far reaching. However, they
were limited by two considerations.
First, the recommendations
concerned the refusal to supply spare parts to an existing customer.
While this might limit corporate decision-making relative to vertical
integration and after-sales service with respect to an existing network of
customers purchasing spare parts for an existing business of after-sales
repair and maintenance, it might not impose the same constraints on ab
initio decisions regarding such matters, like the initial decision whether
to restrict after-sales service to authorized dealers or to perform such
services "inhouse." Second, the findings of (1) a dominant position in a
narrow product market and (2) an abuse of that dominance are not, in
themselves, adequate to establish a violation of Article 82. It is also
necessary to consider (3) whether the abuse satisfied the jurisdictional
requirement of an effect on trade between Member States. And, on this
96
point, Hugin prevailed.
c.

Effect on Trade Between Member States

In the Advocate General's opinion:

94.
95.

Id.at 1904-05, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 365.

96.

See infra Part II.B.4.

Id.
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[T]he abuse of a dominant position on the market, which may be
presumed to exist in the present case, is not, since it concerns a
merely local occurrence without international implications, covered
by Article 86 [Article 82] of the EEC [EC] Treaty but may at most
fall within the ambit of national law relating to competition.
The Advocate General's conclusion was supported by the fact that
Liptons operated only within a relatively small radius of London, and
that the value of spare parts was so low as not to affect appreciably trade
between the then Member States of the then European Economic
Community. He recommended that the Commission decision be
annulled and that costs be awarded against the Commission.98
Judgment of the Court of Justice

4.

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
is shorter, and in some respects less interesting, than the recommendation
of the Advocate General. 99 The Court of Justice considered (1) whether
Hugin occupied a dominant position on the relevant market (which
included the sub-issue of whether a market separate from the market for
cash registers existed), (2) whether Hugin had abused its dominant
position, assuming it occupied a dominant position, and (3) whether there
was the required effect on trade between Member States necessary to
trigger application of European Union competition law. 100
a.

DominantPosition

Before the Court of Justice, Hugin repeated its argument that "the
supply of spare parts and of maintenance services is certainly not a
separate market but is an essential parameter of competition in the
(It will be recalled that Hugin
market for cash registers as a whole."''
occupied a relatively small portion of that market.) Hugin sought to
dispel the notion that a separate market existed by arguing that
service was so intense that Hugin ran those
competition in after-sales
102
services at a loss.
The Court rejected this argument. As did the Advocate General, it
segmented the demand for the supply of spare parts. On the one hand,
individuals had little demand for such spare parts. The implication was
that no separate market for spare parts existed at the level of the ultimate
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Hugin, 1979 E.C.R. at 1911, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 368.
Id. at 1913, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 369.
Id. at 1913-25, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 369-75.
Id.at 1913-23, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 369-74.
Id.at 1914-15, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 370.
Id.
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consumer, and that, for such a consumer, after-sales services could be
regarded as just one element of a larger, unified market for cash registers.
However, according to the Court, the existence of a separate source of
demand for spare parts had to be considered. The Court wrote: "[T]here
exists a separate market for Hugin spare parts at another level, namely
that of independent undertakings which specialize in the maintenance
and repair of cash registers, in the reconditioning of used machines and
in the sale of used machines and the renting out of machines."',0 3 The
existence of this separate source of demand persuaded the Court that "the
market thus constituted by Hugin spare parts required by independent
undertakings must be regarded as the relevant market for the purposes of
04
the application of Article 86 [now Article 82] to the facts of the case."'
In other words, the relevant product market was that of spare parts.
The focus then shifted to supply-side considerations, in order to
determine whether Hugin occupied a dominant position on the market
thus defined. The Court concluded that, as there were few substitutes or
alternative sources of supply for Hugin spare parts, Hugin was in a
position to determine its conduct without taking account of competing
sources of supply.'0 5 Therefore, Hugin occupied a dominant position.
b.

Abuse of Dominance

The Court laid out the parameters of the debate. The Commission
took the view that Hugin had abused its dominant position by refusing to
sell spare parts to Lipton.' 0 6 The effect, according to the Commission,
was "to prevent users of Hugin machines from choosing freely the
undertaking which is to service and repair those machines and [to
exclude] any competition, and in particular a substantial competitor, in
the sector of the servicing, maintenance,
repair, renting out and
07
reconditioning of Hugin machines."'
Hugin defended on the basis of an objective justification, that it had
"legitimate considerations relating to the commercial policy adopted by
Hugin, which entails providing maintenance and repair services of the
highest quality."' 1 8 Hugin also pointed out that its maintenance and
repair after-sales services operated at a loss.' 0 9
The Court dodged consideration of this crucial issue. Instead, it
said that it was necessary "to examine first whether the condition laid
103.

Id.

104.

Id. at

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
See Commission Decision, Hugin, supra note 31.
Hugin, 1979 E.C.R. at 1917-21, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 371-72.
Id.at 1920, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 372.
Id.

1917, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 371.
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down by Article 86 [now Article 82] for the conduct in question to be
covered by Community law is fulfilled."'" 1° That condition specifies that
Article 82 "is applicable only in so far as the conduct regarded as an
abuse of a dominant position occupied by an undertaking on the market
may affect trade between Member States.""'
c.

Effect on Trade Between Member States

The Court concluded that the conduct did not affect trade between
Member States. 112 The reasons were two-fold. First, Liptons operated
only within a small radius of London, and its commercial activities had
never extended beyond the United Kingdom." 3 Second, the value of the
spare parts was so little that they did not constitute a commodity of
commercial interest in trade between Member States." 4 The Court was
not persuaded by the Commission's argument that Liptons's seeking to
purchase spare parts from other sources outside the United Kingdom
constituted the requisite effect on trade between Member States." 5 This
trade would not have occurred but for the refusal to supply spare parts.
According to the Court, Liptons's "attempts to obtain spare parts in the
other Member States can therefore not be regarded as an indication of the
existence, whether actual or potential, of a normal pattern of trade
between the Member States in spare parts."" 6 In the absence of the
requisite effect on trade between Member States, the Court concluded,
"the Commission's decision does not satisfy all the conditions laid down
by Article 17
86 [now Article 82] of the Treaty. It must therefore be
annulled."'
The Court's decision is unsatisfactory in several respects. Perhaps
most significantly, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide the
existence of a separate product market in spare parts, in which a
modestly-sized undertaking almost by definition occupies a dominant
position. In the absence of an effect on trade between Member States,
there was no need to consider the substance of the Commission's
arguments and Hugin's defenses. The Court, upon noting the absence of
the required effect on trade, could have upheld the annulment of the
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1924, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 374.
Id. at 1922-23, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 373.
Id. It is not clear whether this latter conclusion was based on the facts of the

case or whether, as a matter of law, spare parts could never constitute a commodity of
commercial interest in trade between Member States. The Commission undoubtedly
adheres to the former view.
115.
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Commission decision without passing comment upon the Commission's
legal arguments. The Court did not do so. Instead, it considered the
Commission's position that a separate market existed for spare parts and
upheld this argument.
The Court's consideration of the Commission's argument is fairly
weak. It failed adequately to explain why the mere existence of a source
of demand for spare parts distinct from that for the underlying product
compelled the conclusion that a separate product market existed. The
acceptance of such a product market virtually compels the conclusion
that a manufacturer occupies a dominant position in the market. The
separate consideration of whether the undertaking is free to act
independently of other competitors or its own consumers is a mere
formality-in most cases there simply will not be a source of supply
distinct from the undertaking. The Court failed to square its conclusion
that there exists a separate market for spare parts, in which even a
modestly sized undertaking occupies a dominant position, with the
undisputed fact that after-sales services in the case before it ran at a loss.
The classic monopolistic behavior one associates with an undertaking
that occupies virtually one hundred percent of the relevant market was
absent in the case.
The Hugin case arguably differs from the Kodak case in this crucial
regard. In Kodak, there was evidence of rising prices in the "market" for
after-sales services, despite Kodak's argument that supracompetitive
pricing in the market for services would have led to a disastrous drop in
sales of the primary product.' 8 (The United States Supreme Court also
found evidence that prices for the primary product had increased, thereby
rebutting Kodak's arguments that supracompetitive pricing for services
subsidized sub-competitive pricing in the primary product market.'19)
While this evidence precluded the grant of summary judgment, Kodak
still had an opportunity to prevail before a jury on these arguments.120 In
Hugin, on the other hand, the Commission and the Court concluded
ultimately that Hugin occupied a dominant position in the market for
spare parts and services, despite evidence that it suffered a loss in this
"market."121

The Court's decision leaves the Commission free to pursue its view
of what constitutes abuse of a dominant position in a narrow market and
creates a potential trap for modestly sized undertakings considering
commercial policy regarding after-sales service in European markets.
118. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 472 (1992).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 477.
121. See Hugin, 1979 E.C.R. at 1913-17, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 369-70; Commission
Decision, Hugin, supra note 31.
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Also, as the title of this article indicates, the substantive Commission
position represents a risk in the harmonization of antitrust/competition
This risk is
law norms around European Union law positions.
national
of
European
to
convergence
respect
particularly acute with
competition law norms towards the competition law of the European
Union, as there would be no requirement of an effect on trade between
Member States in order to underpin a successful claim of a violation of
national competition law regarding abuse of a dominant position.
Relatively modest undertakings, such as appliance manufacturers, might
find themselves unwittingly the target of a successful prosecution or
lawsuit if they adopt commercial policies regarding after-sales service
that eliminate existing customers of spare parts as potential competitors
in the market for maintenance and repair services.
The risk is not limited to convergence at the national level around
In subsequent discussions around
European Union law norms.
harmonization of competition law at the international level (for example,
in subsequent World Trade Organization discussions following on from
the Doha Development Agenda), any convergence towards the
Commission position could represent a significant constraint on
In considering convergence around the
transnational investment.
European Union norm on this point, it is important not to regard the
conclusions in Hugin and Kodak as, for all purposes, identical. The
different procedural rules and the different stages of the proceedings
need to be considered.
Thus, although there is no conclusive decision by the Court of
Justice regarding what constitutes an abuse of a dominant position in the
market for spare parts, or whether certain commercial policies constitute
an objective justification for the refusal to supply an existing customer, it
is worth seeking insight into the Commission decision via any
subsequent cases that shed light on the Commission's position regarding
abuse of a dominant position in a narrow market. That insight is
provided in the later case of Brass Band Instruments Ltd. v. Boosey &
'
Hawks P/c. 22
III.

Brass Band Case

Brass Band provides further insight into the Commission's views on
narrow product markets and the obligations imposed on manufacturers
over commercial policy regarding supply of goods and spare parts. The
decision implies that the Commission believes that there are procedural
requirements imposed upon a manufacturer before it can refuse to supply

122.

Commission Decision, Brass Band,supra note 34.
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an existing customer.
A.

Facts

Boosey & Hawkes (B&H) was a British manufacturer of brass wind
instruments. Gabriel's Horn House (GHH) was a major retailer of brass
band instruments and a major retailer of B&H instruments. 23 RCN
Music (RCN) was in the business of repairing brass band instruments,
including B&H instruments.
GHH and RCN intended to go into business together to manufacture
high-quality brass band instruments, so as to compete directly with B&H
in the sale of these premium brass wind instruments. When B&H
learned of the plans by GHH and RCN, it immediately ceased its
supplies to these existing customers. In the case of GHH it cut off the
supply of brass band instruments, while in the case of RCN it refused to
supply spare parts. GHH and RCN sought interim relief through the
Commission, seeking to restore supplies from B&H. They argued that
they faced irreparable financial ruin if supplies were not restored.
The issues facing the Commission in this request for interim relief
were (1) whether B&H occupied a dominant position and (2) whether
B&H had abused this dominant position by the refusal to supply GHH
and RCN. (As it was an interim proceeding, the Commission was taking
only a preliminary view as to the ultimate likelihood of success on the
merits, as well as the likelihood of irreparable harm.)
B.

Dominant Position
As the Commission acknowledged:
There are many producers of musical instruments supplying the
Community. It is not alleged that B&H is dominant in this broad
market or even in the wind or brass sectors as a whole. Brass
instruments may be used by orchestras, by pupils in schools, or in a
24
variety of types of professional or amateur bands. 1

Echoing reasoning from the Hugin case, however, the Commission
went on to note that:
Within a broad product market, submarkets may exist which
constitute relevant markets for the purposes of the application of EEC
[now EU] competition rules. The essential question is whether the
sub-market is sufficiently distinct in commercial reality to allow a
supplier which dominates it the power to exclude competition or

123.
124.

id.
Id.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:4

25
control prices. 1

This approach appears to conflate the two-step procedure outlined
in Hugin. Recall that, in Hugin, the Commission first asked whether
there was a distinct market by reason of, essentially, a source of demand
for the product constituting that market. 126 It then inquired whether,
within this market, an undertaking possessed the power to act
independently of competitors, customers, and consumers.' 27 The
implication of the Hugin case would seem to be that a narrow sub-market
might exist in which the undertaking did not occupy a dominant position.
This could be the case by reason of supply-side consideration and/or
potential competition, for example, a manufacturer of a similar product
who could, with relative ease, provide the relevant product in a short
time. After Brass Band, however, it appears that the nature of this
inquiry has changed. The existence of a narrow relevant market seems to
depend upon the ability of a supplier to exclude competition or control
prices-that is, to act independently. 128 Despite this apparent change in
the framing of the inquiry, the approach is fairly similar to that adopted
in Hugin. The issue is whether there is a distinct source of demand for a
narrow range of a product market sufficient to justify the conclusion that
a separate product market exists.
In Brass Band, that product market was described as brass wind
instruments that satisfied the needs of "British-style brass bands."' 2 9
These bands originated in the North of England, where interest is
particularly strong, but the 'brass band movement' has spread to
many other countries including the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark
and Germany. Brass bands are distinguished from other types of
bands using wind instruments (e.g., Marching, Fanfare, Harmonie or
wind bands) by their all-brass instrumentation (as laid down in
championship rules), their musical repertoire and their distinctive
sound. There is a strong emphasis on inter-band contests, and B&H
is closely involved in the organization and promotion of the two
major competitions, namely the United Kingdom National
130
Championships and the European Brass Band Championships.
As the quote intimates, it was the perception by B&H of a separate
market for brass instruments for "British-style brass bands," as well as
the evident demand from this separate segment of the brass band
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
See Commission Decision, Hugin, supra note 31.
See id.
See Commission Decision, Brass Band,supra note 34.
Id.
Id.
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instrument world that supported its conclusion that a separate, albeit
narrow, product market existed. Internal B&H documents reflected
efforts to market to British-style brass bands, and, according to the
Commission: "All the leading contesting brass bands in England are
composed almost entirely of B&H instruments, and amongst enthusiasts
as a whole the first preference is always for B&H.''
The Commission concluded that "this sector may reasonably
constitute an identifiable market (or sub-market) in the Community with
its own peculiar conditions of supply and demand., 132 The Commission
reiterated that "the fact that a market is narrowly defined does not
exclude the application of Article 86 [now Article 82]."' 3 Given that
B&H held a market share of eighty to ninety percent of the narrowly
defined market, the Commission concluded that it occupied a dominant
position (without expressly considering
the issue of whether it had the
34
power to act independently). 1
C. Abuse of a DominantPosition
It is in its consideration of what constitutes an abuse of a dominant
position that the Commission arguably added new ground to its ideas
expressed in the Hugin case. The Commission accepted that the sudden
refusal to deal resulted from B&H learning that GHH and RCN intended
to go into direct competition with it in the manufacture and sale of
premium brass wind instruments intended for British-style brass
bands.135 The issue was whether this constituted an abuse of a dominant
position in this narrow market. The well-established law was that
"refusal of supplies by a dominant producer to an established customer
without objective justification may constitute an abuse under Article
6
86.

0

3

But this begs the question:
what constitutes an objective
justification? In the Commission's view:
A dominant undertaking may always take reasonable steps to protect
its commercial interests, but such measures must be fair and
proportionate to the threat. The fact that a customer of a dominant
producer becomes associated with a competitor or potential
competitor of that manufacturer does not normally entitle the
dominant producer to withdraw all supplies immediately or to take
131.

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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This provides insight into the Commission's substantive view of the
question of what constitutes an abuse of a dominant position. However,
it both added to and took away from this position when it wrote:
There is no obligation placed on a dominant producer to subsidize
competition to itself. In the case where a customer transfers its
central activity to the promotion of a competing brand it may be that
even a dominant producer is entitled to review its commercial
relations with that customer
38 and on giving adequate notice terminate
any special relationship.'
On the one hand, this gloss on what constitutes an abuse seems to
soften the Commission's stance by recognizing that even a dominant
undertaking is not required to underwrite its own competition. However,
it seems to impose a procedural requirement on a dominant undertaking,
to provide notice of a threatened refusal to supply to an existing
customer.
A further indication of the Commission's thinking in this area was
given in the wake of the Kodak decision. At the Symposium on
Competition Policy in a Global Economy, held in Taipei in 1995, Mr.
Thomas Nacke stated:
One cannot be blind to the realities of a given market by categorically
precluding the possible existence of market power in an aftermarket
simply because a manufacturer lacks horizontal dominance. Rather,
it needs to be established, on a case by case basis, whether the market
is sufficiently transparent, whether new customers have sufficient
information in order to make an informed choice at the time of the
initial investment, and whether they can assess the overall lifetime
cost of a given product. In addition, existing customers may be
locked into that specific aftermarket because the 139
switching costs to
another manufacturers product are simply too high.
IV.

Conclusion

Together, the decisions in Hugin and Brass Band, particularly those
at Commission level (which remained undisturbed, with the exception of
the issue of effect on trade between Member States), represent a
potentially far-reaching intrusion into the commercial policy decisions of
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Thomas Nacke, Abuse of Dominant Positions, Speech at the Symposium on
Competition Policy in a Global Economy (Apr. 19, 1995), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1995 025_en.html.
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undertakings doing business in the European Union, at least where those
business dealings can be seen to have an effect on trade between Member
States. These decisions unpleasantly surprise United States business
interests, particularly in fields such as appliance manufacturing, which
occupy a relatively modest proportion of the relevant primary product
market and do not anticipate the consequences of being found to occupy
a dominant position in the separate, narrow market for spare parts. For
these companies, unilateral decisions ordinarily beyond the reach of
competition/antitrust laws may suddenly come under the scrutiny of the
Commission or a private litigant under Article 82 of the European
Community Treaty. Smaller undertakings may be surprised to find
themselves liable for an abuse of a dominant position unless sufficiently
aware of these risks. Even for companies cognizant of these risks, a new
level of procedural obligations may be imposed in the European Union.
Undertakings may be required to provide notice of decisions that may
adversely impact existing suppliers if they occupy a dominant position in
a narrowly-defined market.
The risks do not stop there. The convergence of competition law
norms around a European Union standard means that, even for business
dealings that do not affect trade between European Union Member
States, an undertaking may find itself liable under European national
competition laws. This convergence at the national level may spread
beyond European Union Member States, to the numerous countries
adopting competition law norms roughly patterned after European Union
and United States norms.
Finally, with the increasing likelihood of convergence of
competition law norms at an international level, it behooves academics
and legal advisers to become aware of the Commission's view on the
existence of narrow product markets and the implications that it has for
undertakings found to occupy a dominant position in such a narrow
market. A full consideration of these implications is necessary in the
ongoing convergence of competition/antitrust law at the national and
international levels.

